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PERMISSION TO PUNISH: SANCTIONS
WITHOUT BOUNDARIES
Jaymie L. Roybal*

I. INTRODUCTION
All litigants who appear before the court understand each judge has inherent
authority to regulate the litigation in his or her courtroom. Examples of this inherent
authority are: the power to set litigation timelines, to implement a dress code within
the courtroom, to order discovery, etc. Inherent authority also includes the ability to
sanction parties or attorneys for behavior that is contrary to the integrity of the
judicial process. However, this inherent authority should not be limitless, and there
should be procedural safeguards in place to prevent a trial court judge from imposing
excessive sanctions as punishment for behavior he or she finds inexcusable.
Harrison v. Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico is a case
where a trial judge’s inherent authority to control the litigation on his docket went
too far. In Harrison v. Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals addressed whether a district court’s inherent power to
impose sanctions includes the power to impose a type of sanction called “noncompensatory monetary sanctions” against a public entity.1 This type of sanction is
significant, as sanctions by this label are new to the State of New Mexico, having
never been imposed against a party in the state prior to Harrison.2
In Harrison, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the trial court
judge did have the authority to impose non-compensatory monetary sanctions against
the University of New Mexico.3 In so holding, the Board of Regents of the University
of New Mexico (the “University”) was sanctioned $100,000.4 The court ordered this
money to be paid to four local charitable organizations.5 The underlying basis for
imposing these sanctions was “improper witness interference and tampering” by a
University official in an ongoing medical malpractice claim.6
In its review of the case, the Court of Appeals upheld the sanctions.7 The
main rationale for doing so was “ . . . the need to prevent abusive litigation practice
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1. Harrison v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 2, 311 P.3d 1236.
2. This is the first recorded case in New Mexico history that addresses “non-compensatory monetary
sanctions.”
3. Harrison, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 2.
4. Id. ¶ 10.
5. Id.
6. Id. ¶ 8.
7. Id. ¶ 2.
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and preserve the integrity of the judicial process.”8 Whether the University official’s
conduct was deserving of punishment by the court is not the focus of this note.
However, in upholding the imposition of these sanctions, the Harrison court left
many unanswered questions. First, can punitive assessments be levied against any
New Mexico governmental entity for actions a judge finds improper? Second, were
these sanctions effectively a form of criminal contempt by another name, simply
labeled “non-compensatory monetary sanctions”? Third, it is good policy for a judge
to order taxpayers’ money to go to charity because of the conduct of a University
official?
This note will explore the answers to these questions by: First, by reviewing
the history of non-compensatory monetary sanctions both on the federal level and in
New Mexico, and determining the requirements for imposing such sanctions against
parties; Second, by analyzing these sanctions as applied in Harrison through the lens
of civil and criminal contempt; Third, by discussing whether the New Mexico Court
of Appeals incorrectly held that punitive assessments could be imposed against a
governmental entity and in doing so, expanded a judge’s inherent authority.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background and Procedural History

The University of New Mexico Hospital (“UNM Hospital”) serves as the
primary teaching hospital for the University of New Mexico School of Medicine.9
UNM Hospital operates New Mexico’s only Level I Trauma Center.10 The UNM
Hospital system is a large, complex organization with a complex governance
structure.11 There are numerous boards and executive officers that oversee the daily
functions of the UNM Hospital; however, at the top of this complex governance
structure is the University of New Mexico Board of Regents.12
Harrison v. Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico began as a
medical malpractice claim, in which the Board of Regents of the University of New
Mexico was named as a defendant.13 The claim resulted from a C-section/tubal
ligation surgery.14 The Plaintiff claimed that Mrs. Harrison’s large bowel had been
punctured during surgery, causing her to develop an infection with lifetime
consequences.15
At the time the litigation was taking place, the Plaintiff’s expert witness,
Dr. Ian Paul worked for the University of New Mexico Health Sciences Center as an

8. Id. ¶ 24.
9. About UNM Hospital, UNM HOSPITALS, http://hospitals.unm.edu/about/about-unmh.shtml (last
visited Nov. 1, 2014).
10. Id.
11. See UNM Hospital Board of Trustees Agenda for August 23, 2013, UNM HOSPITALS 20,
http://hospitals.unm.edu/bot/materials/2013.08.23_ePacket.pdf.
12. Id.
13. Harrison, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 4.
14. Harrison v. Lovelace, et al., CV 2009 09855 (order imposing sanctions on defendant University
of New Mexico).
15. Id.
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Assistant Professor.16 Dr. Paul, a pathologist was retained to testify about whether
the bowel punctures had likely arisen from the surgery in question or from a separate
unrelated medical condition.17
During the course of the litigation, Dr. Paul was strongly encouraged to
withdraw his participation by Scot Sauder, an attorney employed by the University.18
After learning of Dr. Paul’s participation in the case, Mr. Sauder communicated his
concerns with Dr. Paul Roth, Chancellor of the University of New Mexico Health
Sciences Center.19 Dr. Roth approved of Mr. Sauder’s plans to inform Dr. Paul’s
supervisors of his plans to testify.20
Mr. Sauder proceeded to contact two of Dr. Paul’s supervisors, Dr. Ross
Zumwalt and Dr. Thomas Williams.21 Mr. Sauder suggested that Dr. Paul’s
involvement with the case created a conflict of interest with the University.22 Dr.
Zumwalt responded to Mr. Sauder’s initial concern, stating in an email: “I am sure
the Regents desire that this case be evaluated by competent, qualified, and unbiased
experts. The Regents are fortunate that Dr. Paul fits those criteria.”23 Mr. Sauder
contacted both Dr. Zumwalt and Dr. Williams again as the litigation proceeded,
insisting Dr. Paul withdraw from testifying in the case.24 Without confirmation that
Dr. Paul was going to withdraw, Mr. Sauder informed the University’s contract
counsel that Dr. Paul would not be testifying.25
Within days of the final communications between Mr. Sauder and Dr.
Paul’s supervisors, Dr. Paul withdrew from the case.26 Dr. Paul explained in an email
to Plaintiff’s counsel that he had been under “a lot of pressure from the higher ups at
UNM” to withdraw from the case.27 Dr. Paul was under consideration for a
significant job promotion at the time this case was happening.28 He testified that he
felt intimidated and feared his career was in jeopardy.29 Furthermore, Dr. Paul
testified that if not for Mr. Sauder’s actions, he would not have stepped down from
the case.30 Additionally, Both of Dr. Paul’s supervisors testified that they did not
believe it was appropriate or necessary for Dr. Paul to withdraw from the case.31
As a result of Mr. Sauder’s conduct, the trial court judge held that the
University should be sanctioned.32 The court issued two different types of sanctions:
16. Harrison, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 4.
17. Harrison v. Lovelace, et al., CV 2009 09855 (order imposing sanctions on defendant University
of New Mexico).
18. Harrison, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 5.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. ¶ 6.
22. Id.
23. Id. ¶ 5.
24. Id. ¶ 6.
25. Id.
26. Id. ¶ 7.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. ¶ 6.
32. Id. ¶ 9.
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compensatory sanctions and non-compensatory monetary sanctions.33 The
compensatory sanctions the University was ordered to pay totaled $32,000, which
included the Plaintiff’s reasonable attorney fees, as well as reasonable costs incurred
in locating and retaining a substitute expert witness.34
In addition to the compensatory sanctions that were ordered, the court
ordered the University to pay non-compensatory monetary sanctions totaling
$100,000, which the court instructed to be divided amongst four local Albuquerque
charities as follows:
$30,000 to the Roadrunner Food Bank
$30,000 to the United Way of New Mexico
$15,000 to the Animal Humane Society of Albuquerque
$25,000 to the Healthcare for the Homeless. 35
The University was ordered to pay these sanctions, totaling $132,000 after
the underlying medical malpractice claim had been settled.36 Additionally, Mr.
Sauder was personally sanctioned by the district court, and was ordered to pay $1,500
to the Roadrunner Food Bank using his personal funds.37
The New Mexico Court of Appeals reviewed the case, and affirmed the
decision of the district court.38 The New Mexico Supreme Court granted a Writ of
Certiorari on October 18, 201339, and later quashed the Writ on Certiorari on May
20, 2014.40
B.

Legal Background
1.

History of Inherent Authority

This section will outline inherent authority in the judicial system generally,
as well as inherent authority of courts in New Mexico.
a. Inherent Authority Generally
Article III of the United States Constitution confers the judicial power of
the United States in “one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish.”41 The Constitution, however, does not
explain all powers of the federal courts established by Article III. A court will often

33. Id. ¶ 10.
34. Id.
35. Harrison v. Lovelace, et al., CV 2009 09855 (order imposing sanctions on defendant University
of New Mexico).
36. Harrison, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 25.
37. Id. ¶ 10.
38. Id. ¶ 2.
39. Harrison v. Lovelace, 2013-NMCA-105 (N.M.), cert. granted, (N.M. Oct. 18, 2013) (No.
34,349).
40. Harrison v. Lovelace, 2013-NMCA-105 (N.M.), cert. quashed, (N.M. May 20, 2014) (No.
34,349).
41. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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use its inherent authority to take action that is not specifically authorized by the
Constitution, a written rule, or a statute.42
A court’s inherent authority is broad and not well defined.43 However,
scholars argue that this authority is critical to the judicial system as a whole.44 It is
essentially “the authority of a trial court, whether state or federal, to control and
direct the conduct of civil litigation without any express authorization in a
constitution, statute, or written rule of court.”45 Inherent authority can best be
understood as a subset of implied powers.46 This authority stems back to the English
common law.47 The United States adopted this concept of a court’s authority over its
processes and procedures from the English courts.48
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of a court’s implied
powers in 1812, stating:
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our courts of
justice, from the nature of their institution. . . . To fine for
contempt, imprison for contumacy, enforce the observance of
order, &c., are powers which cannot be dispensed with in a court,
because they are necessary to the exercise of all others: and so far
our courts, no doubt, possess powers not immediately derived from
statute . . . .49
One facet of a court’s inherent authority is the power to sanction.50 One of
the many reasons behind this power is that “courts must be able to secure obedience
to their rules and protect their processes from abuse or misuse.”51 These sanctions
can be imposed for “violation of the court’s orders and rules, for abuse of process,
and for bad faith litigation, including adjudication for contempt, dismissal of the
action, entry of default judgment, award of costs and attorneys’ fees to opposing
parties, [and] imposition of fines . . . .”52 However, it is unclear to many when and
how a court may invoke its inherent authority; this authority has often been described
as “nebulous and possessing shadowy bounds.”53
One scholar noted, “there is no clear standard establishing when courts may
legitimately invoke their inherent powers to take some action that has not been

42. Joseph J. Anclien, Broader is Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 64 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 37, 38 (2009).
43. Daniel J. Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV.
1805 (1995).
44. Anclien, supra note 42, at 41.
45. Meador, supra note 43.
46. Anclien, supra note 42, at 40.
47. Meador, supra note 43, at 1805–1806.
48. Id. at 1806.
49. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
50. See generally Meador, supra note 43, at 1811.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1820.
53. Anclien, supra note 42, at 41.
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specifically licensed by rule or statute.”54 It is also unclear the role Congress could
potentially play in limiting this authority without interfering with Article III. of the
Constitution.55 Though the boundaries of inherent authority are unknown, it is clear
that courts have relied on this inherent authority at all stages of trial.56
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. is one of the most well known cases regarding
inherent authority on the federal level. In Chambers the United States Supreme Court
held the federal district court properly invoked its inherent power in sanctioning one
party [Chambers] for bad-faith conduct and ordered the party pay attorney fees and
related expenses.57 Chambers is best understood for the proposition that federal
courts have the inherent power to manage their own proceedings and to control the
conduct of those who appear before them. In invoking the inherent power to punish
conduct which abuses the judicial process, a court must exercise discretion in
fashioning an appropriate sanction, which may range from dismissal of a lawsuit to
an assessment of attorney’s fees.58
Furthermore, the Supreme Court expressed that in cases of bad-faith
conduct, courts should generally rely on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
sanction parties; however, per the court’s discretion it may impose sanctions under
its inherent authority.59
b. Inherent Authority in New Mexico
In State ex rel. N.M. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t v. Baca, the New
Mexico Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a district court may award
attorney fees against the State as a sanction for bad-faith litigation.60 Baca concerned
a state employee who was terminated for wrongfully collecting per diem when he
didn’t meet the requirements for receiving the money.61 Mr. Baca appealed his
termination to the Personnel Board and was reinstated following a hearing on the
merits.62 The State proceeded to appeal this reinstatement to the district court, and
the district court remanded the decision of the Personnel Board.63 On remand, the
Personnel Board again ordered Mr. Baca’s reinstatement.64
The State proceeded to appeal this decision again, and the district court
affirmed the decision of the Personnel Board.65 Additionally, the district court found
that the State treated Mr. Baca differently because of his role as a union activist.66

54. Id. (“The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is schizophrenic: it sometimes states that inherent
powers are available only when they are indispensable to the discharge of the judicial power, yet it often
authorizes their use in less pressing situations.”)
55. Id. at 42.
56. Id. at 44.
57. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991).
58. See generally Chambers.
59. Id.
60. 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 1, 896 P.2d 1148.
61. Id. ¶ 4.
62. Id. ¶ 6.
63. Id.
64. Id. ¶ 7.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Therefore, the court held these actions constituted bad faith on behalf of the State
and it was ordered to pay attorney fees.67 This ruling was appealed to the New
Mexico Court of Appeals, which held that “a New Mexico court may invoke its
inherent power and award attorney fees for bad faith litigation.”68 The court noted:
A court may award attorney’s fees in order to vindicate its judicial
authority and compensate the prevailing party for expenses
incurred as a result of frivolous or vexatious litigation.69
The Supreme Court of New Mexico reviewed the case, and acknowledged
a district court’s inherent power as discussed in U.S. v. Hudson.70 To determine
whether these attorney fees were appropriate to award against a governmental entity,
the Court applied a balancing test.71 The interests being weighed were policy
interests favoring punitive damages against those favoring immunity.72 The Court
held that awarding attorney fees against a governmental party was permitted, but
noted “ . . . there is a compensatory aspect to attorney fee awards that distinguishes
them from awards for punitive damages.”73
In its analysis, the New Mexico Supreme Court discussed Torrance County
Mental Health Program v. New Mexico Health & Environmental Department.
Torrance County held that when punitive damages are assessed against the State,
taxpayers are punished rather than those who committed the punishable acts in the
first place.74 The Baca Court noted that Torrance County held that this consequence
undermines the purposes of the punitive sanctions.75 However, the Court in Baca
distinguished attorney fees from punitive sanctions stating:
While it is certainly true that attorney’s fee awards are a punitive
sanction, they also have a compensatory aspect, and whereas the
punitive effect might be lost when an award is made against the
State, the compensatory effect will not.76
In regards to a court issuing these awards through its inherent authority, the
Supreme Court held that “a court’s power only extends to conduct occurring before
the court or in direct defiance of the court’s authority.”77

67. Id.
68. Id. ¶ 8
69. Id. ¶ 12.
70. Baca, ¶ 11; See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
71. Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 19–20.
72. Id. ¶ 19 (quoting Torrance Cnty. Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New Mexico Health & Env’t
Dep’t, 1992-NMSC-026, 830 P.2d 145).
73. Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 22.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.¶ 17.
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Non-Compensatory Monetary Sanctions

This section will outline how non-compensatory monetary sanctions are
imposed on parties on the federal level and in New Mexico.
a. Federal Circuit Split
On the federal level, non-compensatory monetary sanctions are allowed
under Rule 37.78 This type of sanction is not directly named in Rule 37, but the rule
allows for any sanction that is appropriate, thus giving great deference to a judge.79
Non-compensatory monetary sanctions are typically imposed when a discovery
violation has occurred.80 Rule 37(b)(2)(C) states:
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the
court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney
advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the court
finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.81
Built into Rule 37 are requirements that ensure a party’s rights to due
process are protected.82 Substantive due process requires that a sanction must be just
under the circumstances and that the sanction must be related to the specific claim at
issue in the discovery process.83 Procedural due process requires that a party or a
practitioner must have adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard before the
sanctions can be imposed.84
The issue of whether a finding of contempt is required prior to imposing
non-compensatory monetary sanctions has caused a split in the federal courts.85 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that a federal court
has the inherent power to “manage its affairs,” and thus there is no need to have a
finding of contempt in order to impose non-compensatory monetary sanctions.86
Conversely, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held in Law v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n that imposing a non-compensatory monetary
sanction on a party first requires a finding of criminal contempt.87 Holding a party’s
conduct as criminal contempt adds another layer of due process to the case.88
78. Greg Neibarger, Chipping Away at the Stone Wall: Allowing Federal Courts to Impose NonCompensatory Monetary Sanctions Upon Errant Attorneys Without A Finding of Contempt, 33 IND. L.
REV. 1045, 1049 (2000). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b).
79. Neibarger, supra note 78, at 1049.
80. Id. at 1050.
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Other sanctions allowable under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) include striking
pleadings in whole or in part, staying proceedings until an order is obeyed, dismissing an action in whole
or in part, or rendering a default judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
82. Neibarger, supra note 78, at 1052.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1053.
85. Id. at 1049.
86. Id. at 1064.
87. Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1438, 1444 (10th Cir. 1998).
88. Id.
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In Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, the Tenth Circuit equated noncompensatory monetary sanctions with criminal contempt, and held:
. . . defendants in criminal contempt proceedings must be
presumed innocent, proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and
accorded the right to refuse to testify against themselves; must be
advised of charges, have a reasonable opportunity to respond to
them, and be permitted the assistance of counsel and the right to
call witnesses; must be given a public trial before an unbiased
judge; and must be afforded a jury trial for serious contempts.89
The court in this case was concerned that the party being sanctioned [NCAA] didn’t
have adequate notice it might be held in criminal contempt and liable for noncompensatory monetary sanctions, and also didn’t receive adequate due process that
is required for criminal contempt.90 Therefore, “once a court decides the sanction
was non-compensatory, it must ensure that all of the procedural safeguards for
criminal proceedings have been satisfied before it will uphold the sanctions.”91
b. History of Non-Compensatory Monetary Sanctions in New Mexico
As previously stated, Harrison v. Board of Regents of University of New
Mexico is the first case of record in New Mexico that addresses “non-compensatory
monetary sanctions.“ The New Mexico Court of Appeals did not provide an
explanation of non-compensatory monetary sanctions, nor did it detail the procedure
for imposing the sanctions. However, it did distinguish them from punitive
sanctions.92 The court explained:
(1) [t]he award of punitive damages is based on a party’s
misconduct toward [ ] the individual [,]” whereas “[a]n award of
sanctions is based on a party’s misconduct toward [ ] the court.’
(2) punitive damage awards are entrusted to a fact finder, while the
assessment of sanction falls solely within the ambit of the court’s
constitutional power; and (3) ‘[p]unitive damages . . . are not
intended to compensate the injured party,’ while sanctions
imposed under the court’s inherent authority can be both
compensatory and punitive in nature.93
However, this was not the first case in which New Mexico courts have
addressed punitive awards against a governmental entity. Torrance Cnty. Mental
Health Program, Inc. v. New Mexico Health & Env’t Dep’t addressed the question
of whether punitive damages may be recovered from a governmental entity in a
breach of contract action.94 The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the state’s
89. Id. at 1443.
90. Id. at 1444.
91. Neibarger, supra note 78, at 1059.
92. Harrison v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 19, 311 P.3d 1236.
93. Id.
94. Torrance Cnty. Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New Mexico Health & Env’t Dep’t 1992-NMSC026, ¶ 1, 830 P.2d 145.
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policy of not permitting punitive damage awards against a governmental entity in
tort claims, as reflected in the Tort Claims Act, applied to breach of contract cases
also.95 In holding that punitive damages were not recoverable against the government
in breach of contract cases, the court acknowledged the Legislature’s silence on the
issue.96
The Court considered two important policy considerations in reaching its
decision in Torrance County.97 The two policy considerations were: (1) the strong
disincentive punitive damages provide against abuse of governmental power and (2)
the corresponding positive incentive they create for accountability by government
officials in the conduct and management of the programs they are entrusted to
administer.98 Ultimately the Court ultimately held that the necessity to protect public
revenues was the policy that must prevail, unless a statute specifically authorizes that
the monies can be diverted to payment of punitive assessments.99
3.

Contempt

Contempt of court is generally divided into two categories: civil contempt
and criminal contempt.100 Generally speaking, if a court imposes sanctions that are
punitive in nature, i.e. to “vindicate the court’s authority,” the contempt is
criminal.101 The United State Supreme Court has held that in cases of criminal
contempt, the defendant has the right to a jury trial and the right to a neutral and
objective fact finder.102 In Bloom v. Illinois, the Supreme Court stated:
Indeed, in contempt cases an even more compelling argument can
be made for providing a right to jury trial as a protection against
the arbitrary exercise of official power. Contemptuous conduct,
though a public wrong, often strikes at the most vulnerable and
human qualities of a judge’s temperament. Even when the
contempt is not a direct insult to the court or the judge, it frequently
represents a rejection of judicial authority, or an interference with
the judicial process or with the duties of officers of the court.103
In New Mexico, the power to punish for contempt is inherent in the
courts.104 The exercise of such power is to preserve authority and respect for the
courts.105 The Trial Handbook for New Mexico Lawyers defines criminal contempt
as “the power of the court to punish for the purpose of vindicating its public

95. Id. ¶ 2.
96. Id. ¶ 19.
97. Id. ¶ 25.
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 27.
100. Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the Excessive Fines Clause, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 407, 410 (1998).
101. Id. at 411.
102. Id. at 415. See also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968).
103. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968).
104. J. DUKE THORNTON, TRIAL HANDBOOK FOR NEW MEXICO LAWYERS § 5: (citing Case v. State,
1985-NMSC-103, 709 P.2d 670).
105. THORNTON, supra note 104, § 5:1 (citing Purpura v. Purpura, 1983-NMCA-001, 847 P.2d 314).
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authority.”106 Civil contempt is remedial and aids the court in furthering the cause of
justice between litigants.107
The Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico distinguished between
criminal and civil contempt as follows:
Proceedings for contempt are of two classes - those proscecuted to
preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the courts, and to
punish for disobedience of their orders, and those instituted to
preserve and enforce the rights of private parties to suits, and to
compel obedience to orders and decrees made to enforce the rights
and administer the remedies to which the court has found them to
be entitled. The former are criminal and punitive in their nature,
and the government, the courts, and the people are interested in
their prosecution. The latter are civil, remedial, and coercive in
their nature, and the parties chiefly in interest in their conduct and
prosecution are the individuals whose private rights and remedies
they were instituted to protect or enforce.108
Furthermore, in State v. Magee Pub. Co., the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that criminal contempt:
. . . embraces all acts committed against the majesty of the law,
or, to clothe the thought in other language, it may be said to include
those acts done in disrespect of the court, or which obstruct the due
and proper administration of justice, or which tend to bring the
court into disrepute in the form of public opinion.109
In addition to the distinction between civil and criminal contempt, there is
an important distinction between direct and indirect contempt. Direct contempt is
committed in the court’s presence, while indirect contempt is committed outside of
the court’s presence.110 Examples of direct contempt include: an attorney failing to
follow criminal appeal rules or refusal of a witness to testify.111 Examples of indirect
contempt include: disobedience of a court order or the intimidation or unlawful
coercion of a witness.112
III. RATIONALE
A.

New Mexico Court of Appeals: Majority Opinion

On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the question of
whether a district court’s inherent power to impose sanctions for a party’s
misconduct during litigation includes the authority to issue a non-compensatory

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

THORNTON, supra note 104, § 5:2.
Id.
Costilla Land & Inv. Co. v. Allen, 1910-NMSC-044, 110 P. 847, 848.
State v. Magee Pub. Co., 1924-NMSC-023, 224 P. 1028, 1029.
THORNTON, supra note 104, § 5:3.
Id.
Id.
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monetary sanction against a public entity.113 The court affirmed the district court’s
ruling, upholding the non-compensatory monetary sanctions imposed against the
University.114
Judge Vanzi, writing for the majority began the court’s analysis by first
acknowledging a district court’s inherent authority.115 The court rejected the
University’s argument that non-compensatory monetary sanctions could not be
levied against it because of its status as a governmental entity.116 Relying on State
Highway and Transp. Dept. v. Baca, the court stated:
A fundamental aspect of a court’s exercise of its inherent power is
the principle that a court’s inherent authority extends to all conduct
before the court and to all parties appearing before the court,
regardless of the party’s status as a private litigant or as a
governmental/public entity.117
The University did not challenge the district court’s inherent authority to
impose the sanctions, but it did challenge the nature of the sanctions themselves.118
The University’s main argument was that the sanctions could not be imposed because
they were not compensatory in nature.119 The purpose “ . . . instead, was solely a
punitive sanction designed to punish the Regents for their conduct and to act as
deterrence.”120 The University also challenged the sanctions on public policy
grounds.121
Responding to the nature of the sanctions, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals distinguished non-compensatory monetary sanctions from punitive
damages.122 The court relied heavily on two cases to make its decision: State
Highway and Trans. Dept. v. Baca and Torrance Cnty. Mental Health Program, Inc.
v. New Mexico Health & Env’t Dep’t. The issue in Baca was whether a district court
had the authority to award attorney fees against the State as a sanction for bad-faith
litigation.123 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that a district court could award
attorney fees against a governmental entity for bad-faith litigation.124 The University
contended that Baca stood for the proposition that attorney fees were appropriate
113. Harrison v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 12, 311 P.3d 1236.
114. Id. ¶ 2.
115. Id. ¶ 15.
116. Id. ¶ 20.
117. Id. ¶ 16.
118. Id. ¶ 17.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. ¶ 19 (“(1) ‘[t]he award of punitive damages is based on a party’s misconduct toward[ ] the
individual[,]’ whereas ‘a]n award of sanctions is based on a party’s misconduct toward[ ] the court,’ . . .
(2) punitive damage awards are entrusted to a fact finder, while the assessment of sanction falls solely
within the ambit of the court’s constitutional power; and (3) ‘[p]unitive damages . . . are not intended to
compensate the injured party,’ while sanctions imposed under the court’s inherent authority can be both
compensatory and punitive in nature”) (citations omitted).
123. State ex rel. New Mexico State Highway & Transp. Dep’t v. Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 1, 896
P.2d 1148.
124. Id. ¶ 12.
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because the fees have a compensatory aspect and a punitive aspect; therefore, the
court could not uphold sanctions that only have a punitive effect.125 The New Mexico
Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating that this proposition was only one
aspect of the Baca court’s holding, and was not the sole basis for the decision.126
In Torrance County the issue was whether punitive damages could be issued
against a governmental entity for a breach of contract action.127 The Supreme Court
of New Mexico held that the Tort Claims Act applied and therefore, the government
was shielded from paying punitive damages in tort cases.128 The Court also extended
this premise to cases involving breach of contract issues.129 In Harrison, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals rejected Torrance County as controlling because Torrance
County did not concern the district court’s “inherent power to sanction conduct that
abuses the judicial process.”130 The court also used supporting authority to further
illustrate these points.131
The University argued that imposing these sanctions was against public
policy because the sanctions would punish innocent taxpayers who took no part in
the wrongful conduct.132 The court rejected this argument, stating “these concerns
are ‘subordinate to a court’s authority to control the parties and the litigation before
it.’”133 The court explained that the University’s argument was not persuasive
because in effect, any sanction results in punishing the public through expenditure
of public funds.134 Additionally, the court stated, “In our view, sanctions are punitive
by their very nature.”135
Disregarding the public policy concerns set forward by the University, the
court reiterated that the district court has the inherent authority to impose noncompensatory monetary sanctions.136 It emphasized “The policy behind a district
court’s inherent authority is the need to prevent abusive litigation practice and
preserve the integrity of the judicial process.”137
Lastly, the court acknowledged the unique procedural posture of the case.138
It defended the actions of the district court judge in imposing the sanctions after the

125. Harrison, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 21.
126. Id.
127. Torrance Cnty. Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New Mexico Health & Env’t Dep’t 1992-NMSC026, ¶ 1, 830 P.2d 145.
128. Id. ¶ 2.
129. Id.
130. Harrison, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 19.
131. See id. (citing Restaurant Mgmt. Co. v. Kidde-Fenwal, Inc., 1999-NMCA-101, ¶ 11, 986 P.2d
504. See also State v. Candelaria, 2008-NMCA-120, ¶ 22, 192 P.2d 792; Fernandez v. Farmers Ins. Co.
of Ariz., 1993-NMSC-035, ¶ 15, 857 P.2d 22; Gonzales v. Surgidev Corp., 1995-NMSC-047, ¶¶ 12–13,
899 P.2d 594).
132. Harrison, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 24.
133. Id. ¶ 22.
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138. Id. ¶ 25.

230

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 46; No. 1

litigation ended, stating “the options for sanctions available in the case were severely
limited.”139
B. New Mexico Court of Appeals: Dissenting Opinion
Judge Garcia, writing in dissent opined that he disagreed with the majority
that a court has a right to exercise its inherent legal authority to impose a purely
punitive sanction against a governmental entity for improper conduct during a legal
proceeding.140 The dissenting opinion criticized the “non-compensatory monetary
sanction” label used by the majority, arguing it was purely a punitive sanction.141
Judge Garcia wrote:
Where a sanction has no compensatory component and is issued
exclusively for the purpose of punishment and deterrence, the
sanction is the equivalent of a punitive damages award.142
The majority and the dissent agree on the competing public policy interests
regarding awarding punitive damages against a governmental entity.143 Judge Garcia
characterized these competing policy interests as a balancing of interests, writing:
The need to protect public revenues and to prevent the injustice of
punishing innocent taxpayers rather than the officials at fault must
be balanced against the need to deter abuse of governmental power
and to promote accountability among government officials.144
His dissent criticized the majority for failing to address the competing
policy concerns in depth in its analysis.145 He also attacked the notion that courts
need more authority to impose punitive awards in order to “deter an abuse of power
and promote accountability among governmental officials.”146
In doing so, he noted the inherent differences between the powers a district
court has in controlling the litigation before it compared with the power a jury has.147
A court has greater power than a jury to deter such abuse.148 He argued that the
$1,500 sanction imposed on Mr. Sauder personally is one example of a power the
court has that the jury does not.149 However, he argued that the $100,000 sanction
imposed on the University has no effect on Mr. Sauder professionally, nor does it
further deter the conduct.150 Furthermore, this sanction brings no other value to the

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. ¶ 30 (Garcia, J., dissenting opinion).
Id. ¶ 31.
Id.
Id. ¶ 33.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 35.
Id.
Id.

2016

SANCTIONS WITHOUT BOUNDRIES

231

public policy being implemented because the innocent taxpayers are the ones paying
the cost of the public official’s punishable conduct.151
Judge Garcia argues that this is already well within the court’s broad power
to deter conduct through issuing effective compensatory sanctions.152 He explained
the court incorrectly justified its decision because the district court can already
achieve the desired end without additional means in terms of adding power to judicial
authority.153 He argues that juries, rather than the district courts might be the body
that needs additional authority in order to deter this type of conduct.154 In presuming
that the jury process is incapable of appropriately punishing a governmental entity,
Judge Garcia argues that the jury component of our legal system is undermined.155
He stated:
It is an unfortunate mistake to presume that judges and not juries
possess the exclusive knowledge and ability to determine when a
purely punitive award must be imposed on a governmental entity
and then paid by innocent taxpayers from public revenues.156
IV. ANALYSIS
The New Mexico Court of Appeals arrived at the incorrect result in
Harrison. In its analysis, the court relied almost exclusively on the inherent authority
of the district court judge to control the litigation in his or her courtroom as
justification to uphold the non-compensatory monetary sanctions, thereby punishing
the University for the inappropriate conduct of its employee. In this section, I argue
that the court effectively disregarded New Mexico precedent governing, as well as
legislative intent that concerns governmental immunity. Additionally, the decision
left many questions unanswered. Perhaps most importantly for parties and
practitioners alike: what are “non-compensatory monetary sanctions” and under
what parameters are governmental entities subject to being punished by said
sanctions?
A.

Inherent Authority of the District Court

The fact that the district court has inherent authority is unquestioned. The
limits of a court’s inherent authority are unknown, but it should be used sparingly.
The New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized that district court judges have the
inherent authority to “impose a variety of sanctions on both litigants and attorneys in
order to regulate their docket, promote judicial efficiency, and deter frivolous
filings.”157 This authority is critical to judicial efficiency and ensuring that both
parties and practitioners act in accordance with the rules and the law. This authority

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. ¶ 36.
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156. Id. ¶ 37.
157. State ex rel. New Mexico State Highway & Transp. Dep’t v. Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 11, 896
P.2d 1148.
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extends to all courts, as was recognized by The United States Supreme Court in
1812.158
Inherent authority touches all aspects of litigation, i.e. it can allow a judge
to regulate dress, filings procedures, conduct, etc. However, the court’s inherent
authority, though not well defined, must have boundaries. It should not be treated as
a limitless power. In the case of Harrison, the court went too far.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals relied on the district court’s inherent
authority in upholding this specific type of sanctions against a governmental entity,
The University of New Mexico.159 It did not punish the University pursuant to a rule
or statute; instead, it effectively created a black hole type of sanction that was not
well defined or well explained.
For these reasons, if courts to exercise this inherent authority in imposing
non-compensatory monetary sanctions against a party, it would be most appropriate
to do so with a finding of criminal contempt first. This would ensure that a party’s
due process rights are protected, and guarantees that a party has the opportunity to
be heard by a neutral fact finder and/or a jury of his or her peers.
It is important to recognize that Harrison is the first case of record that
addresses “non-compensatory monetary sanctions” by name in New Mexico.
Because of this, the court should have honored a more honest approach in imposing
these sanctions against the University. The court went through great lengths in
describing what these sanctions are not, even attempting to distinguish them from
punitive damages.160 In doing so, it unveiled what they are, which are punitive
sanctions.161 The very name “non-compensatory monetary sanctions” illustrates the
punitive nature of the penalty. If the sanction is not compensatory, logic would
follow that the sanction is therefore punitive. Furthermore, the court used the wide
reach of the judge’s inherent authority to impose the penalties162, thus creating a
situation where challenging the penalties on appeal would be difficult.
It is important to note that the court did not address whether the uniqueness
of the non-compensatory monetary sanctions requires a different analysis from
compensatory sanctions.163 It offered no framework under which this type of
sanction can be imposed in the future. Because there was no discussion of this new
type of sanction and how or if it fit under the umbrella of inherent authority, the court
effectively expanded its inherent authority without justification.
The court offered no guidance as to where future monies resulting from
non-compensatory monetary sanctions could be directed to. In the Harrison case,
Judge Malott directed the $100,000 to four local charitable organizations, including
Roadrunner Food Bank, United Way of New Mexico, Animal Humane Society of
Albuquerque and Healthcare for the Homeless. Based on the silence of the Court of
Appeals as to whether this was an appropriate action, it can be inferred future
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sanction monies can be directed to the charity or organization of the district court
judge’s choice.
B.

Incorrect Application of Precedent

To begin its analysis, the court immediately rejected both holdings of
Torrance Cnty. Mental Health Program, Inc. v. New Mexico Health & Env’t Dep’t
and State Highway and Trans. Dept. v. Baca, stating neither decision was controlling
because neither dealt with a district court’s inherent power.164 However, in doing so
the court effectively disregarded New Mexico precedent governing, as well as
legislative intent that concerns governmental immunity. The court drew narrow lines
between the issue in Harrison and the issues presented in both Baca and Torrance
County in order to achieve a different result.
The New Mexico Supreme Court weighed “policy interests favoring the
recovery of punitive damages against those favoring immunity for governmental
entities” in Torrance County.165 The Court concluded that the policy interests behind
governmental immunity outweighed policy interests of recovering punitive damages
for breach of contract actions.166
In Harrison, the New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected Torrance County
because it did not directly address a court’s inherent power to sanction conduct that
abuses the judicial process.167 However, in doing so the court disregarded the
legislative intent clearly expressed in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, which
prohibits punitive damages to be assessed against governmental entities.168 It is
important to note that the case which gave rise to the sanctions in the first place was
a medical malpractice claim, a tort under New Mexico law.
Judge Timothy Garcia, writing for the dissent stated that the majority
“asserts that misconduct toward the court must be given greater weight than
misconduct toward a party when punitive punishment of a governmental entity is a
consideration.”169 This creates an unfair standard for parties who are governmental
entities compared to parties who are not.
The analysis applied in Torrance County should have been applied in
Harrison. At the core of each case was the issue of punitive assessments against a
governmental entity.170 Torrance County held that “the state’s policy of not
permitting assessment of punitive damages in tort cases, as reflected in our Tort
Claims Act, applies also, despite legislative silence on the issue, to breach-ofcontract cases.”171 Though damages and sanctions are distinct as they serve different
purposes, it is reasonable to infer that the protections of immunity in the Tort Claims
Act regarding punitive awards were intended by the Legislature to extend to the

164. Harrison, 2013-NMCA-105, ¶ 18.
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government in all cases. Applying this framework would mean that all punitive
assessments against a governmental entity are barred. The Harrison court ignored
this fundamental similarity between the two cases and instead distinguished them
narrowly for the purposes of punishing the University.172
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Baca articulated the balancing test from
Torrance County in determining whether attorney fees could be assessed against a
governmental entity.173 In doing so, the Court held that attorney fees could be
assessed against a governmental entity.174 However, the Court noted that “there are
certain checks upon an attorney’s fees award that are absent from a punitive damages
award.”175 One significant difference between the two is that attorney fees have a
compensatory aspect and are not punitive in nature.176
Like the Harrison court rejected Torrance County as controlling, it also
rejected the principles of Baca as controlling.177 The University contended the Baca
stood for the proposition that “the inherent power of a court to sanction a party before
it – even a governmental entity – would be honored, but only on the condition that
the sanction have a direct compensatory effect for the benefit of the other party to
actually remedy the wrongdoing.”178 The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Harrison
declined to accept this as the holding of Baca.179
The Supreme Court in Baca did go to great lengths to distinguish
compensatory awards from punitive awards.180 It is arguably clear from Baca that
the Court was concerned with imposing punitive damages against a governmental
entity.181 The court in Harrison incorrectly interpreted Baca and instead the
principles articulated were applied to disadvantage the University.
If Baca had been interpreted in the light most favorable to the University,
the only sanctions that would have been upheld are those that were compensatory in
nature. The New Mexico Court of Appeals could have upheld the district court’s
awards of both attorney fees and the cost to the Plaintiff in retaining a new expert
witness. However, in its interpretation of Baca the court extended the case’s holding
and used it to support the punitive nature of the non-compensatory monetary
sanctions imposed against the University.182
The New Mexico Court of Appeals, however, did articulate the balancing
test used both in Torrance County and Baca.183 The court in Harrison characterized
the competing policy concerns as follows:

172. See Harrison 2013-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 18–19.
173. State ex rel. New Mexico State Highway & Transp. Dep’t v. Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 20, 896
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180. See State ex rel. New Mexico State Highway & Transp. Dep’t v. Baca, 1995-NMSC-033, ¶ 21–
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The need to protect public revenues and to prevent the injustice of
punishing innocent taxpayers rather than the officials at fault must
be balanced against the need to deter abuse of governmental power
and to promote accountability among governmental officials.184
Nonetheless, the court found the policy concern of punishing innocent
taxpayers for the actions of a government official unconvincing and upheld the noncompensatory monetary sanctions.185 The court stated that these concerns were
“subordinate to a court’s authority to control the parties and the litigation before
it.”186
The University of New Mexico, as a public institution is funded primarily
by the State of New Mexico, and therefore New Mexico’s taxpayers. Therefore, an
award of punitive sanctions against the University punishes only the taxpayers, who
took no part in the punishable action. The University serves a public good – when it
is forced to pay punitive awards, its student consumers are the ones who are
ultimately hurt.
C.

Unanswered Questions about “Non-Compensatory Monetary Sanctions”?

The New Mexico Court of Appeals did not point to any rule or statutory
authority that addressed “non-compensatory monetary sanctions.” The court also did
not offer any guidance or framework as to how these sanctions would be analyzed.
Instead, it emphasized the differences between punitive damage awards and noncompensatory monetary sanctions, including:
(1) “[t]he award of punitive damages is based on a party’s
misconduct toward [ ] the individual [,]” whereas “[a]n award of
sanctions is based on a party’s misconduct toward the court”; (2)
punitive damages are entrusted to a fact finder, while the
assessment of sanctions falls solely within the ambit of the court’s
constitutional power; and (3) “[p]unitive damages . . . are not
intended to compensate the injured party,” while sanctions
imposed under the court’s inherent authority can be both
compensatory and punitive in nature.187
While the court clarified these few differences, many ambiguities
surrounding non-compensatory monetary sanctions still exist. The court in Harrison
did not discuss whether non-compensatory monetary sanctions in New Mexico
would be regarded in the same manner as the federal courts regard these sanctions.
The court failed to acknowledge the purposes for which non-compensatory monetary
sanctions are used on the federal level.
As previously stated, there is a split in the federal circuit regarding noncompensatory monetary sanctions.188 Generally, in federal court non-compensatory
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monetary sanctions are allowed under Rule 37.189 The sanctions are typically
imposed when a discovery violation has occurred.190
The Tenth Circuit has held that imposing a non-compensatory monetary
sanction on a party requires a finding of criminal contempt.191 Holding a party’s
conduct as criminal contempt adds another layer of due process to the case.192
Contrary to federal procedures, the sanctions in Harrison were not imposed against
the University for a discovery violation, but rather for misconduct during the
litigation process.193
The New Mexico Court of Appeals did not reference this analytical
framework in its decision in Harrison. Furthermore, it did not reference any of the
Tenth Circuit’s decisions in its analysis. As a result, it remains unclear what the
guidelines are for assessing these sanctions against a party in New Mexico. However,
it is clear that the sanctions are a good tool to prevent misconduct from litigants in
the future. One might even argue the New Mexico Court of Appeals intentionally
did not detail an analytical framework for these sanctions, as not knowing the limits
of the sanctions might be the deterrent altogether.
Because of this confusion, New Mexico should follow the precedent set in
the Tenth Circuit regarding imposing non-compensatory monetary sanctions against
a party. Following this approach would ensure that parties and practitioners
understand the purposes of the sanctions and furthermore, understand the process of
how the penalties may be imposed.
If the Court of Appeals had followed the approach adopted by the Tenth
Circuit, it would have required the district court to first hold a hearing as to whether
the University was guilty of criminal contempt. This hearing would have been before
a neutral fact finder.
However, the sanctions were imposed against the University after the
underlying medical malpractice action had ended.194 The University filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of Sanctions Award on January 11, 2012.195 Because of the filing
of this motion, a hearing was held and the parties had the opportunity to be heard.
However, if not for this motion it is likely that there would have been no hearing and
the University would not have received adequate due process.
Adopting the Tenth Circuit approach in New Mexico would ensure that all
parties have the opportunity to be heard before a large sanction is imposed against it.
Furthermore, adding this additional layer of due process would ensure that a district
court judge cannot misuse his or her power in imposing excessive amounts of
sanctions for conduct that he or she finds inexcusable.
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Was Harrison an Issue of Contempt?

The New Mexico Court of Appeals stated that a primary reason for
imposing non-compensatory monetary sanctions against the University was to deter
this type of abusive conduct by litigants in the future.196 In imposing the sanctions,
the district court stated: “[t]hat any public entity, let alone the flagship University of
this State, believes it has such power to stifle comment is both terrifying and in
violation of public policy[.]”197 It is clear from the language of the court that these
sanctions were intended to punish the University for conduct that the court found
intolerable.
The court did not classify the non-compensatory monetary sanctions as
either criminal or civil contempt, it merely classifies them as a deterrent.198 Though
the court did not expressly label the sanctions as an act of criminal contempt, it falls
under this classification by definition.199 New Mexico precedent states that criminal
contempt:
embraces all acts committed against the majesty of the law, or, to
clothe the thought in other language, it may be said to include those
acts done in disrespect of the court, or which obstruct the due and
proper administration of justice, or which tend to bring the court
into disrepute in the form of public opinion.200
Because the non-compensatory monetary sanctions imposed against the
University meet the requirements for criminal contempt in New Mexico, the Court
of Appeals violated the University’s due process rights in upholding the sanctions
without providing the additional procedural safeguards necessary in cases of
contempt.
To reiterate, the sanctions were imposed on the University after the
underlying medical malpractice claims had been settled.201 The court stated that
because of the unique procedural posture of the case, the options available for the
sanctions were limited.202 But the procedural posture of the case raises interesting
questions regarding the imposition of the sanctions, including: (1) Should noncompensatory monetary sanctions have been imposed at all, since the underlying
claims had been settled? (2) Should there have been a separate action regarding the
sanctions? (3) Did Scot Sauder receive adequate due process given that he was
sanctioned separately but was not a named party to the lawsuit?
Because of the striking similarities regarding the reasoning for imposing the
sanctions against the University and the definition for criminal contempt in New
Mexico, the sanctions should not have been imposed without a finding of criminal
contempt. The University was not afforded a separate trial regarding the sanctions,
nor were the issues ever presented before a jury. These procedural safeguards were
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sidestepped. These opportunities should have been afforded to the University before
these penalties were imposed. Moreover, these opportunities should be afforded to
parties subject to non-compensatory monetary sanctions in the future.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The New Mexico Court of Appeals ultimately set new precedent in holding
that a district court’s inherent power to impose sanctions includes the authority to
impose non-compensatory monetary sanctions against a public entity.203 In so
holding, the court set a dangerous precedent: When a party that is a governmental
entity conducts litigation in a manner intolerable to the court and the integrity to the
judicial system, the court may punish that party at the taxpayers’ expense.
Furthermore, a district court judge has the power to direct those taxpayer monies to
any cause of his or her choosing as a result of Harrison.
A.

Normative Argument / Proposal

I propose that imposing non-compensatory monetary sanctions upon a party
that is a governmental entity requires a finding of criminal contempt before a party
can be penalized. A party should receive a trial by jury and an opportunity to be heard
before a neutral fact finder.
Furthermore, I propose that if there has been a finding of criminal contempt
and non-compensatory monetary sanctions are imposed against a party, the monies
be paid into a new fund. This new fund should be established to take the monies from
the punitive sanctions and allocate it to fund legal aid services in NM. This will
prevent the arbitrary nature of where the sanctions should be paid and it removes a
judge’s bias and favor towards any one group or cause. Allowing a judge to direct
funds to any cause or his or her choosing could lead to the imposition of noncompensatory monetary sanctions on parties for the wrong reasons.
Lastly, if New Mexico courts continue to uphold the imposition of noncompensatory monetary sanctions against governmental entities, I propose the courts
create explicit guidelines for such a punishment. These guidelines should be
established to protect taxpayers and public monies alike, and should reflect the
Legislature’s intent to safeguard public funds.
B.

Counter Arguments

The most apparent counterargument to this approach is that requiring courts
to find criminal contempt before imposing these sanctions complicates a process that
is already complex. Furthermore, adding this step to the process restricts a judge’s
inherent authority to control the litigation in his or her courtroom.
One could also argue the court should not define the boundaries of noncompensatory monetary sanctions because they are such an extreme remedy that will
be used sparingly. One reason why parties will be deterred from behaving in such a
way that the sanctions will be imposed on them is because they don’t know the limits
so they will be less inclined to test them.
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Lastly, one could argue that the $100,000 sanction had no real impact on
the University because of the sheer size of the institution. If the judge’s goal was to
deter future misconduct, he should have imposed an amount that would have affected
the University’s budget in a more significant way.
C.

Test Suites

1. If the sanction to be imposed was less than $100,000, the judge should
have held a criminal contempt hearing before imposing the sanctions on the
University. If the University was found to not be in contempt of court, the sanctions
should not have been imposed at all. Any non-compensatory monetary sanction that
is going to be imposed upon a party should require a finding of criminal contempt.
2. In Harrison the sanctions were ordered to be paid to four local charities.
If a case with the same facts were to be presented today, a criminal contempt hearing
should first take place. If it is found that the party is guilty of criminal contempt, the
punitive sanctions should instead be paid into a new fund established to assist in
funding legal aid services in New Mexico.
VI. CONCLUSION
This note aimed to explore the uniqueness of non-compensatory monetary
sanctions in the New Mexico jurisprudence. Specifically, this note aimed to explore:
(1) if punitive assessments can be levied against a governmental entity under a
court’s inherent authority, (2) what exactly “non-compensatory monetary sanctions”
are, and if at their core they are a form of criminal contempt, and (3) if it is good
policy to force taxpayers’ money to go to charity because of the conduct of a
government official. Furthermore, this note has attempted to provide an alternative
foundation for imposing this new type of sanction against a party that is a
governmental entity in New Mexico.
This proposal, imposing non-compensatory monetary sanctions upon a
party would require a finding of criminal contempt before the sanctions can be
imposed, seeks to ensure that taxpayer money is safeguarded and that the government
receives adequate due process. Furthermore, this suggestion ensures that any
imposition of these sanctions is fair. This extra procedural safeguard would prevent
a misuse of judicial power. This proposal does not seek to strip courts of the inherent
authority they possess, yet to suggest a more honest approach in terms of process.
What is clear about imposing non-compensatory monetary sanctions
against a party that is a governmental entity is that a court must find a harmonious
balance between immunity and punishment. Furthermore, these sanctions are an
extreme remedy and if New Mexico courts continue to impose them under a judge’s
inherent authority, this power should be used sparingly and the boundaries should be
better defined.
This note has hopefully assisted legal practitioners, the courts and parties in
understanding non-compensatory monetary sanctions in New Mexico. As the
boundaries of both a court’s inherent authority and non-compensatory monetary
sanctions continue to be defined in New Mexico, parties and practitioners alike
should be cautioned to not cross the line between zealous advocacy and acting in a
manner contrary to the integrity of the judicial process.

